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I. INTRODUCTION: ALI BIDS FAREWELL TO TOUCH
AND CONCERN
The pending Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes aban-
dons the requirement, first articulated in Spencer's Case,1 that to
"run" with the land real covenants and equitable servitudes must
touch and concern the benefitted and burdened land. The touch and
concern requirement has been replaced with a series of non-constitu-
tional standards which courts can use to invalidate real covenants and
equitable servitudes. This Article criticizes the proposed new Restate-
ment rules for jettisoning a vague, but useful, doctrine in favor of
more unworkable and redundant invalidation standards. My criti-
cism of the proposed Restatement is offered as part of a symposium
honoring one of the most productive and thoughtful American prop-
erty law scholars, Professor Lawrence Berger of the University of Ne-
braska College of Law. It is offered in the spirit of Professor Berger's
work. He has always tried both to explain and illuminate the purpose
of the law of real property, as well as public and private land use con-
trols, and to ground legal doctrines in basic ideas of fairness and
efficiency.2
A. The Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes in
Context
In comparison to the Restatements of Contracts and Torts, the his-
tory of the Restatement of Property has been a less happy story of the
codification of the progressive reform efforts of common law judges.3
1. 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (KB. 1583).
2. See Lawrence Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv.
165 (1974).
3. The question of the basic purpose of the American Law Institute (ALI) continues
to be the subject of lively historical and contemporary debate. The historical is-
sue is whether the ALrs original purpose was to implement progressive ideas of
legal reform or to support the dominant elite's effort to save the common law from
statutory liberalization. N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspec-
tive on the Origins of the American Law Institute, 8 LAw & HIST. Rzv. 55 (1990),
sets out the case for the first view. John P. Frank, The American Law Institute,
1923-1998, 26 HoFsTRA L. REv. 615 (1998), reviews the same history, acknowl-
edges that the "is/ought" tension was present from the start, but suggests that
the adoption of minority or evolving doctrines accelerated with the Restatement
Seconds. The recent history of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liabil-
ity illustrates that the tension between progressive reform and the maintenance
of the status quo remains endemic to the ALI process. See The Honorable Shirley
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The Restatement (First) of Property has long been viewed as a par-
tially failed reform exercise. This view has developed because of the
Restatement's failure to "restate" the law of real covenants which run
with the land in accord with the widespread acceptance of the utility
of private land use control instruments. Prepared in the midst of the
Great Depression, the Restatement (First) of Property took a dim view
of covenants running with the land. Affirmative covenants that re-
quired the payment of money were viewed by the Reporter as poten-
tial engines of small landowner bankruptcy, and their use was
discouraged. The law was "restated" to impose a number of restric-
tions on subsequent purchasers regarding enforcement of affirmative
burdens and benefits. The primary restriction was an extremely re-
strictive definition of horizontal privity. The rules articulated in the
Restatement (First) and their underlying assumptions were contested
at every stage of discussion in the Institute4 and savaged by commen-
tators, such as Charles Clark, as ahistorical.5 However, the restric-
tive theory of affirmative covenants prevailed and as a result of the
covenant section, the Restatement (First) of Property was largely ig-
nored by courts. Thus, it never enjoyed the prestige of the Restate-
ments of Contracts and Torts and consequently, never became an
important source of doctrinal reform.
The Restatement (First) did not curb the widespread use of real
covenants and other private land use control devices. Private land use
restrictions flourished in the decades following World War II. Private,
or as they are now called, "common interest communities," were cre-
ated throughout the country. A mix of legal and equitable restrictions
were employed to create de facto constitutions for the governance of
residential community associations (RCAs). Such restrictions are ge-
nerically called covenants, conditions and restrictions (CCRs), or sim-
ply servitudes. Courts were very supportive of the use of real
covenants, equitable servitudes and liens to tax homeowners for the
S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories: Wisconsin and the American
Law Institute, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 1, 21-23; James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D.
Twerski, The Politics of the Products Liability Restatement, 26 HoFsTRA L. REv.
667 (1998); Victor E. Schwartz, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Lia-
bility-The American Law Institute's Process of Democracy and Deliberation, 26
HOFSTRA L. REV. 743 (1998); Marshall S. Shapo, Products Liability: The NextAct,
26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 761 (1998); Frank J. Vandani, The American Law Institute Is
Dead In the Water, 26 HoFsTRA L. REv. 801 (1998).
4. See Henry Upson Sims, The Law of Real Covenants: Exceptions to the Restate-
ment of the Subject by the American Law Institute, 30 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1944).
5. For Clark's classic attack, see Charles E. Clark, The American Law Institute's
Law of Real Covenants, 52 YALE L.J. 699 (1944), reprinted in CHARLEs E. CLARK,
REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RuN WITH LAND" 206 app. I (2d
ed. 1947) [hereinafter CLAPic, REAL CovENANTs]. Henry Upson Sims was more
measured, but nonetheless trenchant, in his attack on the Reporter, Oliver S.
Rundell of the University of Wisconsin. See Sims, supra note 4, at 27-41.
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provision of community services and to regulate property use and indi-
vidual behavior. This view was also supported by many scholars who
praised the privatization of public services. The Restatement (First)'s
concern with the use of real covenants to impose unjust private tax
burdens proved largely unfounded, but a new set of concerns arose.
Students of local government worried about the political relationship
between RCAs and traditional public governments. Others worried
that common interest community citizens were entitled to less protec-
tion from arbitrary RCA actions than citizens of public communities
who are protected by the full force of the Constitution.6
In the 1970s, the American Law Institute (ALI) began the process
of rehabilitating the Restatement (First) by bringing property law in
line with changed social conditions. The Restatement (Second) of
Property addressed the rapidly changing law of landlord-tenant. The
common law granted tenants few rights and imposed few duties on
landlords. The Kennedy-Johnson War on Poverty triggered-the use of
landlord-lord tenant law to impose affirmative maintenance duties on
landlords to benefit tenants living in "slum" housing. The Restate-
ment (Second) adopted most of the reforms of the law of landlord-ten-
ant spawned by the War on Poverty, most notably the implied
warranty of habitability.7 The Restatement (Third) of Property has
continued this reform tradition by validating the widespread creation
of common interest communities by making it easy to create servi-
tudes that create comprehensive regulation and taxation schemes.
The Restatement (Third) also attempts to articulate non-Constitu-
tional standards of judicial control which limit the use of servitudes
that bump up against fundamental constitutional rights of individual
expression and freedom from discrimination.
B. The Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes and the
Risks of Living in a Common Interest Community
Since the 1980s, the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes,
hereinafter referred to as the Restatement (Servitudes), has been ag-
gressively reforming and unifying the law of easements, real cove-
nants, equitable servitudes and profits a prendre in two not entirely
consistent ways. The Restatement (Servitudes) both tries to correct
6. For a very useful collection of papers on the pros and cons of common interest
communities, see U.S. ADviSORY COASMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELA-
TIONS, RESIDENTIAL CO nIawNriy ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GovERiiENTs IN THE IN-
TERGOvERN mNTAL SYsTEm? A-112 (1989).
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY. LANDLORD AND TENANT §§ 5.1-5.6
(1977). The late Dean Charles J. Meyers dissented because the implied warranty
would increase the rate of landlord exit from the residential market. See Charles
J. Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and the American Law Institute, 27
STAN. L. REv. 879 (1975).
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the mistakes of the Restatement (First) by liberalizing the rules for
the creation and enforcement of real covenants, but at the same time
carries forward the policy of the Restatement (First) that the enforce-
ment of covenants should be rigorously policed by the judiciary. The
Restatement (Servitudes) simplifies a confusing, but utilitarian, part
of modern real property law. Privately negotiated instruments re-
specting the use of land are presumed to be an efficient and fair way
for landowners to share the use of two or more tracts, to assume recip-
rocal burdens and benefits, and to assume the necessary financial bur-
dens to effectuate the promises. Landowners are generally free to
create any servitude arrangement that they clearly intend, unless
there is a strong reason to restrain freedom of contract. However, the
Restatement (Servitudes) also squarely situates the modern problems
with servitudes in the context of the common interest community and
the concern with the failure of these "private governments" to ade-
quately protect minority rights.8
Common interest communities have been in place for over a cen-
tury, but they are becoming more and more prevalent. After initial
resistance, many people now choose condominium or town house liv-
ing, either out of personal preference or economic necessity. The prac-
tice of sorting people by homogeneous architecture and behavior rules
create islands of security and tranquility in the midst of a rapidly
changing society. In addition to a desire for maintenance-free living,
the fear of crime and social diversity is driving many people into
planned, gated communities. In response, many architects and plan-
ners are trying to construct neo-traditional communities which offer
the form of a smaller community. Neo-traditional communities offer
more social interaction, but have less unpredictability and risk of
"real" smaller communities. The regulation of the servitude regimes
found in these communities is difficult because no consensus exists
about the need for regulation.
Common interest communities are a mixed blessing because the
benefits are tempered by legitimate concerns for their residents and
for the larger society. Social commentators differ in their assessment
of these communities. The views range from uncritical enthusiasm to
fears that these communities, especially the new gated communities
in the West, seal the growing gap between rich and poor.9 Like all
governments, common interest communities provide services de-
8. See generally EDWARD J. BLAxELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA:
GATED COMM-UNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1997); EvAN McKENzIE, PRIVATOPIA:
HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT
(1994). As fear of crime has increased, gated common interest communities have
dramatically increased in popularity. See Rebecca J. Schwartz, Comment, Public
Gated Residential Communities: The Rosemont, Illinois Approach and Its Consti-
tutional Implications, 29 URB. LAW. 123 (1997).
9. See ROBERT KAPLAN, AN EMPIRE WILDERNESS: TRAVELS IN THE NEW WEST (1998).
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manded by the market at some cost to individual freedom and tradi-
tional notions of republican governance. Common interest
communities promote both the liberal values of individual choice and
autonomy. They allow individuals to purchase a richer menu of physi-
cal and social living arrangements than those provided by public gov-
ernments. However, these liberal values can be undermined by the
decision to opt into a common interest community. Common interest
communities thus illustrate the central problem of communitarian
ethics: the price of maintaining a community is often at the expense of
individual autonomy.' 0 Physical differences among properties and a
certain level of mess are the price we pay for individual choice. Au-
thoritarian regimes create more well-ordered environments. Private
representative governments can infringe autonomy values with less
ease than public governments because of the power of common inter-
est governance bodies to pass a wide range of restrictions on a mem-
ber's "life" and property use. These restrictions often, but not always,
exceed the level of regulation that public governments think are nec-
essary to maintain property values and to prevent externalities in an
area. The Restatement (Servitudes) has articulated a great deal of
new and controversial law regulating the use and enjoyment of prop-
erty in the burgeoning common interest communities around the na-
tion to bridge the central dilemma of closed community governance
and the infringement of individual freedom. The question is whether
the touch and concern doctrine has a continuing role in this project.
C. Touch and Concern and Its Substitutes
To many, the touch and concern doctrine is a feudal relic best
abandoned. Modern attitudes toward touch and concern have been
shaped, in part, by the fate of the Restatement (First)'s horizontal
privity rule. In contrast to the Restatement (First), the new Restate-
ment recognizes that the imposition of servitudes that are intended to
bind subsequent purchasers of benefitted and burdened land are the
norm, not the exception. To this end, it eliminates both the horizonal
privity and touch and concern requirements. The elimination of the
first requirement is long overdue. Horizontal privity has ceased to be
a meaningful judicial barrier to running covenants. There never was
a rational case for the rule as a matter of doctrine or policy and there
is no present reason for the rule if one accepts the utility of long-term
servitude regimes.
This reasoning does not necessarily apply to the touch and concern
doctrine. Touch and concern is an old but not totally dysfunctional
10. For a thoughtful and critical analysis of the recent interest in communitarian
ethics, see WiLL KY--.icKA, CONTEmPORARY POLITICAL PILOsoPy: AN INTRO-
DUCrION 199-237 (1990).
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doctrine compared to the requirement of horizontal privity. The con-
trast between the treatment of horizontal privity and the touch and
concern doctrine illustrates the current Restatement's dual objectives
of simultaneously simplifying and scrutinizing the use of these instru-
ments. Touch and concern continues to be diligently, if incoherently,
applied by courts because it has a function, although courts often have
trouble articulating it. More recent drafts of the Restatement (Servi-
tudes) grudgingly concede this point after initially discounting it. Af-
ter consigning touch and concern to the rubbish heap of outmoded
English land law doctrines along with horizontal privity, the latest
draft of the Restatement (Servitudes) acknowledges that the doctrine
"appears to retain more currency than other traditional doctrines"lX
and seeks to retain the spirit of the test. The Restatement (Servi-
tudes) formally abolishes the doctrine, but in place of the simple but
extremely vague phrase, it substitutes a much broader and more in-
trusive test for judicial invalidity. A court may refuse to enforce a cov-
enant that meets the intent and vertical privity standards if "it is
illegal or unconstitutional or violates public policy."' 2
Elimination of the touch and concern requirement in the Restate-
ment (Servitudes) responds to longstanding criticisms of academic
commentators and judges that the standard is either too imprecise to
be a predictive guide to judicial scrutiny of a covenant or has ceased to
perform any useful substantive screening function.13 However, the
Restatement (Servitudes)'s decision to retain the doctrine's underlying
function by formally expanding, rather than contracting, judicial dis-
cretion to invalidate real covenants and equitable servitudes is ini-
tially curious for two reasons. First, the elimination of the touch and
concern requirement is inconsistent with the simplification thrust of
the Restatement (Servitudes). The primary objective of the new Re-
statement is to eliminate much of the baroque facade of the law of
"servitudes" and replace it with modern, functional doctrines which
both unify and simplify the law. Unification starts with the adoption
of the generic term "servitudes" for all of the private arrangements
that the common law recognizes to share the use, as opposed to the
possession, of different parcels of land among two or more parties.
However, the Restatement (Servitudes) recognizes that some distinc-
tions among servitudes must be maintained. An easement, for exam-
ple, remains different from promises respecting the use of land
because an easement performs a different function. The Restatement
11. RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (Tentative Draft No. 7,
1998).
12. Id.
13. The Reporter stated her case against the doctrine in Susan F. French, Toward A
Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REv.
1261, 1319 (1982), and Servitudes Reform and the New Restatement of Property:
Creation Doctrines and Structural Simplification, 73 CoRNsLL L. Ruv. 928 (1988).
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(Servitudes) replaces the terms "real covenant" and "equitable servi-
tude" with the single term "covenant that runs with land."'4 It simpli-
fies the law by announcing, to the maximum extent possible, common
intent-based requirements for all use-sharing arrangements and by
eliminating rules that are no longer justified. However, with respect
to touch and concern, the elimination of the formal requirement has
not led to simplification, but to more open-ended standards to invali-
date covenants.
The Restatement (Servitudes) replacement of the touch and con-
cern doctrine with more intrusive rules of judicial intervention is an
accurate mirror of the current debate over the doctrine's function, but
discounts the strong support among courts and commentators for re-
tention of the doctrine.' 5 There is a widespread consensus among
commentators that the rule is vague and, therefore, impossible to re-
duce to a single, uniform test. However, there is a lively debate among
academic commentators about the need for judicial review of servi-
tudes imposed by predecessors in interest upon current possessors, es-
pecially since the current possessors are generally the only parties
liable for breach of the servitude.16 In recent years, academic com-
mentators have abandoned the effort to reduce "touch and concern" to
a test. Instead, a great deal of work has been done to articulate the
objectives that the standard seeks to achieve. Professor Lawrence
Berger has been a leader in this effort. His foundation work has pro-
vided a strong platform for others to build upon and his scholarship
has provided a more coherent rationale for the touch and concern doc-
trine to guide courts in applying the doctrine. Nonetheless, the Re-
statement sides with those who argue that there is a need for judicial
supervision of past bargains and strikes out in a new direction that
has quite limited academic and judicial support.
The elimination of touch and concern is not a simplification be-
cause the standards of servitude invalidity are increased, not de-
creased. The elimination of touch and concern is also not an adoption
of the opinions of "progressive" courts which have jettisoned an old
doctrine in favor of a new, more progressive rule.' 7 In Davidson
14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.4 (Tentative Draft No. 7,
1998).
15. Recent influential commentators have endorsed the use of the doctrine. See infra
notes 68-70, for a discussion of the modern defenses of the doctrine.
16. See Gallagher v. Bell, 516 A.2d 1028 (Md. App. 1986).
17. Section 433(3)(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted Justice Carter's
opinion in Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). Summers involved a situa-
tion in which one of two hunters shot plaintiffbut each denied liability. Plaintiff
could never meet his burden to establish separate liability so the court presumed
that both actors were liable and shifted the burden of proof to the defendants to
absolve themselves. Summers is the foundation of alternative theories of liability
for dangerous products or pollution when there are multiple potential actors
19981
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Brothers v. D. Katz & Sons, Inc., 1 8 one of the most recent leading cases
to rethink the doctrine, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized
that the doctrine has evolved from a mechanical screening test to a
more open-ended reasonableness test. However, the court did not sub-
stitute a reasonableness test for the traditional touch and concern doc-
trine. 19 The court held only that touch and concern "is but one of the
factors that a court should consider in determining the reasonableness
of the covenant."20 The fact the courts continue to adhere to the doc-
trine half-heartedly is, of course, no reason to retain it. However, the
question of the doctrine's modern function is more complex than the
Restatement (Servitudes) acknowledges.
Placing the modern law of servitudes in the context of common in-
terest communities represents the best, progressive tradition of the
ALI. The harder task is to criticize the Restatement (Servitudes)'s to-
tal abandonment of touch and concern. This Article both explains and
criticizes the replacement of touch and concern with more opened
standards for judicial invalidation. The Restatement's new real cove-
nant screening rules can be explained as a necessary exception to the
move toward complexity, rather than simplification, by another major
thrust of the Restatement (Servitudes). The dominant servitude para-
digm has been a private two-party use sharing regime. However, the
modern reality is that the most important use of servitudes is to pro-
vide the legal foundation for common interest communities. These
communities range from high-rise urban condominiums to rural mo-
bile home parks to sunbelt golf communities. These communities en-
hance the quality of living for their members and help guarantee the
value of the property investment. But, as students of the New Eng-
land town meeting and other small public interest "common interest"
communities have learned, these communities can intrude deeply into
personal choices and are not always models of fiscal prudence and re-
sponsibility. The Restatement (Servitudes) addresses common inter-
est community governance directly by adopting community
governance standards. It places all servitudes, especially real cove-
nants and equitable servitudes, in the context of common interest
community governance. Thus, servitudes are now subject to double
screening. They must be valid under Section 3.1 of the Restatement
(Servitudes) and under Sections 6.5 and 6.7, which are part of a new
which could have caused the injury. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924
(Cal. 1980); King v. Cutter Lab., Inc., 714 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1998).
18. 579 A.2d 288 (N.J. 1990). See Paula A. Franzese, "Out of Touch:" The Diminished
Viability of the Touch and Concern Requirement in the Law of Servitudes, 21 SE-
TON HALL L. REv. 235 (1991).
19. See id. at 293-94.
20. Id. at 295.
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section on common interest community governance. 2 1 These two sec-
tions subject both assessments and regulations to a reasonableness
standard.22
The critical thesis of this Article is that the touch and doctrine has
a useful role to fulfill in policing the enforcement of servitudes over
time which is not fully reflected in the new, more intrusive screening
rules. Touch and concern protects the long-run economic expectations
of landowners who assume a financial servitude obligation. The mod-
ern function of the doctrine is primarily to assure subsequent purchas-
ers that there is a reasonable relationship or nexus between the
financial burdens imposed and the benefits to their property. Most of
the Restatement (Servitudes)'s new screening rules, especially the di-
rect replacements for touch and concern, are efforts to curb the power
of common interest communities to regulate lifestyle choices. In the
rush to extend the scope of landowner protection, the Restatement
(Servitudes) may have diminished the traditional pocketbook protec-
tion that landowners have enjoyed. Touch and concern, with all its
vagueness, remains a useful judicial tool to protect legitimate finan-
cial expectations of purchasers when they are frustrated by the use of
funds for purposes with remote benefits to the burdened land.
II. A BRIEF AND NOT TOO HELPFUL HISTORY OF TOUCH
AND CONCERN
A. What Little We Know About Spencer' Case
Landowners may enter into promises which allocate benefits and
burdens among related parcels of land. These servitudes can be en-
forced by successors in interest to the original parties to the agree-
ment. The common law has long allowed promises relating to the use
of land to "run," although the reasons are often difficult to determine.
Initially, real covenants which ran with the land were a special class
of promises enforceable in law. They were an exception to the general
rule that promises were personal to the makers. English land law
viewed real covenants that run with great suspicion, but the law vir-
tually ceased to develop because real covenants became less important
after Tulk v. Moxhay.23 Tulk created a new class of servitudes which
run with the land, equitable servitudes, although real covenants re-
mained the only basis for the imposition of fiscal obligations on land-
owners. Tulk v. Moxhay applies only to negative use restrictions.
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES §§ 6.5, 6.7 (Tentative Draft
No. 7, 1998). Section 6 is premised on "[t]he judgment that residential common
interest communities require greater legal intervention than commercial devel-
opments." id. § 6.1 cmt. a.
22. See id. §§ 6.4, 6.7.
23. 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
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There are three formal requirements for a running covenant, 24 which
have remained relatively unchanged since the Sixteenth Century.
First, the original parties must intend that the covenant run.2 5 Sec-
ond, there must be horizontal privity between the original covenantor
and covenantee and vertical privity between the original parties and
their successors in interest.26 Third, the covenant must touch and
concern the land.27 In addition to these three requirements, the per-
son against whom enforcement is sought must have notice of the re-
striction, a due process-based notion.
American courts adopted the law of Spencer's Case but liberalized
English land law. The restrictive English rules for horizontal privity
were expanded to make it easier for covenants to run.28 In addition,
with the possible exception of New York, American courts have re-
jected the per se prohibition against the running of affirmative, as op-
posed to negative, covenants. 2 9 Courts continue to assert that the
covenant touch and concern the land, but the requirement has never
been a major barrier to the running of covenants. The history of the
doctrine does not provide any clear guidance to its historical function
or purpose. The subsequent history of the doctrine does show that the
current policy debates about the core function the requirement per-
forms-judicial screening of remote bargains that impose unreasona-
ble fiscal burdens on landowners-have long been part of the law of
real covenants. Thus, a core function with continuing utility can be
identified.
"Touch and concern" is conventionally traced to the statement in
Spencer's Case that running covenants are limited to those which
"touch and concern the thing devised" and not to those that are
"merely collateral to the land."30 The case reflects the fact that cove-
nants originated in promises relating to land3' and that certain land-
related obligations had long been allowed as exceptions to the princi-
ple that Quia Emptores barred all encumbrances. Touch and concern
was originally confined to real covenants, but it is equally a require-
ment for the enforcement of an equitable servitude,3 2 although the
24. See Spencer's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K-B. 1583). For a discussion of each of these
requirements, see Lawrence Berger, A Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting the
Use of Land, 55 MiNN. L. REv. 167 (1970).
25. See Spencer's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (IKB. 1583).
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See Uriel Reichman, Toward A Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. Rev.
1179, 1190-1218 (1982).
29. See infra note 113.
30. 77 Eng. Rep. 72, 74 (IKB. 1583).
31. See JAMES BARR AMEs, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 98 (1913). Ames observed
that "[t]he earliest covenants we find in the books seem to touch the land." Id.
32. See Norcross v. James, 2 N.E. 946 (Mass. 1885).
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courts have been less than consistent in requiring it.33 History sheds
little direct light on the meaning of the term, but it does illuminate the
conflict between praise and condemnation of the doctrine that has
characterized the modern law of real covenants. In brief, touch and
concern is a minor part of the larger development of a special class of
promises that did not remain personal to the original makers. To
Holdsworth, the interesting question was whether the burden or bene-
fit of a covenant could run with the reversion.3 4 The idea of succession
of rights and duties can be traced as far back as Bracton's adoption of
the Roman fiction that the status of pater families continued in spite
of deaths of the corporal head of the family.3 5 The idea of succession
had long been applied to allow successive transferees of an estate in
fee simple and was extended to allow assignees of lifetime leases to
sue to enforce a covenant of warranty.3 6
Doctrinally, the law of real covenants that run is conventionally
explained as an outgrowth of the law of warranties, but the immediate
origins of the modern covenants can be traced to Henry VIII's decision
to redistribute the Catholic Church's land holdings in England after
the country left the Roman Catholic Church for the Church of Eng-
land. A 1540 statute,37 enacted to shore up Henry VIII's gift of rever-
sions of dissolved former Catholic monasteries, forfeited to the crown
under the Statute of Mortmain, 38 to his favorites. The law, as under-
stood at the time, appeared to bar the running of any covenant unre-
lated to warranties, and the statute was ambiguous on whether it
confirmed or extended the common law.3 9 To make the reversions val-
uable, the Statute provided that both the assignees of the reversion
and of the lease should have the same advantages against the lessees
as the original lessors had to enforce the benefits and burdens of any
33. See Berger, supra note 24, at 220-32.
34. See 7 W.S. HOLnswORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 287 (1924).
35. See OLIVER WENDELL HoLms, JR., THE COASION LAw 265-88 (Mark DeWolfe
Howe ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881).
36. See HOLDswORTH, supra note 34, at 287.
37. The Statute of 1540, 32 Henry 8, ch. 34.
38. The monasteries had been, of course, anticipating dissolution since the break
with Rome in 1534 and with the increasing assertion of Royal control over the
nascent Church of England, had begun to lease the lands. Thus, Henry VII had
to make the reversions valuable. Parliament did this by allowing the grantees of
the reversion to enforce the benefit of the covenants and by making the assignees
of the lessees reciprocally liable for burdens. See A.W.B. SmwsoN, A HISTORY OF
THE LAND LAw 255-56 (2d ed. 1986). The dissolution of the monasteries marked a
final step in the creation of the Church of England and was an important step in
the 16th century transformation of land into a market commodity. See G.R. EL-
TON, REFOM AND REFORMATION: ENGLAND, 1509-1558, at 230-49 (1977).
39. See Sims, supra note 4, at 9-10 (arguing that "there is nothing in the early law to
justify" an assumption that "assignees of reversions before the statute did not
have the right to enforce covenants in leases").
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covenants. Lessees and their successors in interest were given recip-
rocal rights against the lessor and "their heirs and successors."40
The statute was ambiguous because one section confirmed that les-
sees could enforce their common law rights against the original lessors
and their "heirs and successors," but the section did not contain a cor-
relative grant to lessees and their assigns.4 1 This led to doubts among
conveyancers as to whether burdens, as opposed to benefits, ran at
common law. Not surprisingly, the great opponent of Stuart divine
right, Edward Coke, regarded the question of the ability of the burden
of a covenant to run between a landlord and a tenant as settled,
although he admitted that the issue was a matter "upon which there
is little or no medieval authority."42 Other authorities were more cir-
cumspect. Spencer's Case both recognized that burdens could run and
was the first case to place limits on covenants which could run, but it
did not settle the broader question of whether privately imposed land
use burdens could run at common law.
Holdsworth explained the case as both based on older precedent
and then contemporary "obvious needs of landlords and tenants" for a
reciprocal rule of running burdens and benefits. 4 3 Therefore, the case
was "perhaps new law."44 He characterized the case as another in the
long line of cases limiting the power of private parties to encumber the
use of land and justified the touch and concern standard because it
strikes a balance between freedom of alienability and "considerations
of convenience."45 Spencer's Case is a perfect reflection of the transi-
tion from the medieval to the modern world that occurred in the 16th
century.46 Furthermore, two strains in the debate about touch and
concern can be traced to Holdsworth's sketchy reading of the case.
One line of analysis views the basic idea of running covenants as an
unfortunate incursion on alienability because it imposes undue and
unanticipated financial burdens on subsequent landowners. This
view was articulated by Lord Brougham in Kepple v. Bailey4 7 and is
today vigorously defended by A.W.B. Simpson,4 8 as well as by Richard
40. The Statute of 1540, 32 Henry 8, ch. 34.
41. See id.
42. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 34, at 287.
43. See id. at 289.
44. Id. at 290.
45. Id.
46. See Samuel E. Thorne, Sir Edward Coke, 1552-1952, in ESSAYS IN ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY 223, 226 (1985).
47. 39 Eng. Rep. 1042 (Ch. 1834).
48. See SIMPSON, supra note 38. Simpson states, "The effect of a restrictive covenant
is to sterilize the use of a parcel of land permanently; in principle it is not at all
clear that a private landowner ought to be allowed to do this without public con-
trol over his activities." Id. at 257.
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Epstein. 49 Under this view, the problem is not with touch and concern
per se, but with the basic idea that a real covenant can run. The sec-
ond strain assumes that sharing arrangements are mutually benefi-
cial to the benefitted and burdened land, and thus, should endure
until unanticipated conditions intervene or until enforcement becomes
unfair. It recognizes that encumbrances can decrease the value of
land, but places the burden on the party objecting to enforcement to
establish this. Lord Broughham, Simpson and Epstein start from the
presumption that servitudes will decrease the value of land. Others
start from the opposite presumption, provided that judicial invalida-
tion remains an option in limited cases.
III. THE FUTILE MODERN SEARCH FOR A SIMPLE
DEFINITION OF TOUCH AND CONCERN
The vagueness of the touch and concern standard did not become a
major issue until the twentieth century when more pervasive and in-
trusive private land use restrictions came into use. Public land use
controls are basically a product of the post-World War I United States.
Prior to this time, servitudes and the law of nuisance were the pri-
mary means of land use control. The modern common interest com-
munity is an outgrowth of the rapid expansion of cities after the Civil
War and the creation of the modern suburb as a separate and superior
enclave from the central city.5 0 Courts aided these developments by
adapting the law of servitudes to their widespread use to buffer resi-
dential enclaves from external and incompatible development. Judi-
cial decisions eliminated the per se barrier against the running of
affirmative covenants, created the common plan doctrine which al-
lowed equitable servitudes to be implied from a reasonably apparent,
geographically delineated scheme of land use restrictions, 5 1 and
eroded the prohibition against express novel negative easements.5 2
These liberal rules created a need for some limitation on the use of
servitudes to reflect the common law's traditional distrust of encum-
brances on land and the realization that servitude schemes could have
major impacts on land values. Touch and concern was the best avail-
able limitation because it was not an archaic feudal rule whose origi-
49. See Richard A- Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes,
55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1353, 1360-64 (1982).
50. In his classic study of the function of suburbs, Robert C. Wood defined suburbia
"as an ideology, a faith in communities of limited size and a belief in the condi-
tions of intimacy." ROBERT C. WOOD, SuBuRBIA: ITs PEOPLE AND THEIR POLITICS
18 (1958); see also KENNETH T. JAcKSON, THE CRAB GRAss FRONTIER: THE
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985).
51. See Sanborn v. McLean, 206 N.W. 496 (Mich. 1925); Sharts v. Walters, 759 P.2d
201 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).
52. See Peterson v. Friedman, 328 P.2d 264 (Cal. 1958)(negative easement of view).
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nal function had ceased, but a flexible doctrine that did not unduly
deter the creation of servitude regimes.
The touch and concern doctrine posed problems for the rising aca-
demic legal community. Open-ended standards are more troublesome
to law professors than to lawyers and judges. Law professors abhor
doctrinal vacuums because they prefer predictability and rationality
to open-ended rules that can be molded by either party to a dispute.5 3
Despite our celebration of the give and take of common law adjudica-
tion,5 4 we strive for the precision of civil law rules. When this is not
possible, we try to restate rules as a multi-factor balancing test.
Touch and concern has defeated all efforts to turn the law of covenants
into a rule or even multi-factor test. Courts and commentators have
been able to agree on the core requirement of touch and concern, but
on little else. The essence of the touch and concern doctrine is that the
covenant must relate to the physical use of land,s5 as opposed to
merely specifying individual behavior. This is another way of saying
that the original covenantor and covenantee must intend that the cov-
enant run with the land, and thus, the agreement is not personal to
them. However, there is a crucial difference between the intent test
and the touch and concern test. Intent always looks backwards to the
intention of the parties at the time that the covenant was created.
Touch and concern looks both backwards and forwards. The physical
relationship requirement must be met at the creation of the covenant
and is a continuing screen to assure that the purpose of the covenant
can be fulfilled, regardless of who currently owns the property. This
requirement also assures that the enforcement of the covenant as a
land use restriction is fair because it fulfills the reasonable expecta-
tions of the landowner.
53. The older realistic tradition of law as a method of dispute resolution, has been
challenged both by the utopian left and the right who articulate a variety of re-
ductionist theories of law. Generalizing wildly, the left wants to use law to create
a virtuous society. See Steven D. Smith, Reductionism in Legal Thought, 91
COLUM. L. REv. 68, 73-74 (1991). Smith surveys the damage done to the common
law by these newer theories and advocates a return to the legal process school of
the 1960s which was premised on a faith in principled, interest-based decision-
making by judges. See id. On the other hand, the right wants to use law to pro-
mote efficiency or to govern society by a new version of the German Rechtsstadt,
fixed rules divorced from justice. See Justice Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as
a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989).
54. See EDWARD LEvi, THE LEGAL PROCESS (1949).
55. See CLARic, REAL CovENANTs, supra note 5, at 99 (describing touch and concern
"as intimately bound up with the land."); JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL,
PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 759
(1998)(describing touch and concern as a requirement that "often refers to a phys-
ical use or restriction of the covenantor") Recent cases to articulate the use of
land test include Lowry v. Norris Lake Shores Development Corporation, 203
S.E.2d 171 (Ga. 1974), and Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Company v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 521 A.2d 734 (Md. 1987).
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Professor Harry Bigelow stated the most ambitious and influential
analytical test for touch and concern, but the test has been more often
quoted than actually applied. Thus, it has not led to a more consistent
standard or practice of judicial intervention. Influenced by the John
Wesley Hohfeld's scheme of legal relations, Bigelow tried to develop a
coherent, universal test for the doctrine.5 6 He defined touch and con-
cern by measuring the legal relations of the parties as landowners
with and without the covenant.5 7 If the covenant changed a party's
relations as a landowner, rather than a general member of the public,
the covenant touched and concerned.5 8 The burden of a covenant
touched and concerned if it rendered the covenantor's interest less val-
uable and the benefit touched and concerned if it rendered the cove-
nantee's more valuable.59 The initial problem with the test is its
circularity. Any restriction will be applied to an individual as opposed
to the general community. The restriction changes the individual's
powers, privileges, rights and duties compared to his or her position
without the covenant. In addition to circularity, the test fails to artic-
ulate any standard to help a court separate "good" from "bad"
burdens.60
The weaknesses of the Bigelow test were well recognized at the
time of the drafting of the Restatement (First). Legal realism was in
full flower, and Dean (later Judge) Charles Clark tried to recast the
Bigelow test as a simpler common sense inquiry: "Where the parties,
as laymen and not as lawyers, would naturally regard the covenant as
intimately bound up with the land, aiding the promisee as landowner
or hampering the promisor in a similar capacity, the requirement
should be held fulfilled."61 The problem is that courts have often tried
to combine the two tests. This unfortunate tendency can be traced
back to Judge Lehman's heroic attempt to adapt the touch and con-
cern test to the modern common interest community in Neponsit Prop-
erty Owners Association v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank.62 This
56. See Harry A.- Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in Leases, 12 MICH. L. REV. 639
(1919).
57. See id.
58. See id. at 646.
59. See id.
60. For a formalistic and unwarranted application of the Bigelow test for touch and
concern see Mapleturn Utilities, Inc. v. Foxcliff South Associates, Inc., 673 N.E.2d
5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). A subdivider advanced money to a private utility to ex-
tend water service to a new unit of the development, and the two parties cove-
nanted that the utility would remit a portion of the connection fees it charged
private lot owners. The agreement also granted the developer an easement over
the utility's real estate for construction and maintenance purposes. The court
conceded that the utility extension added value to the lots in the unit, but that
the estate granted the utility did not concern the subdivision unit properties.
61. CLARK, REaL COVENANTS, supra note 5, at 99.
62. 15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1938).
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case held that common area assessments touched and concerned when
the roads and "public places" that they maintained added value to the
individual lots in a well-maintained private community. As a good
common law judge trying to uphold a fair bargain, Judge Lehman had
to bob and weave around the exception-riddled New York law of af-
firmative covenants in order to uphold the covenant. Judge Lehman
accepted the Bigelow test because it had "the merit of realism." 6 3 In
the end, however, he articulated a much more general standard:
Thus, unless we exalt technical form over substance, the distinction between
covenants which run with land and covenants which are personal, must de-
pend upon the effect of the covenant on the legal rights which otherwise would
flow from ownership of land and which are connected to with the land. The
problem then is: Does the covenant in purpose and effect substantially alter
these rights?6 4
This problem is that the issue is not the change in legal rights but the
nexus between the burdens and benefits assumed and promised.65
Two primary views of the touch and concern doctrine have
emerged post-Neponsit. The simplest view is that the touch and con-
cern doctrine performs no function and is, in Professor Epstein's opin-
ion, bankrupt. 66 Principles of freedom of contract and ownership
should allow property owners to impose any restriction they want.
These covenants, efficient or not, should run so long as subsequent
purchasers have adequate notice of them.67 The more complex and
more widely shared view among property scholars is that the pre-
sumption that the original restriction is mutually beneficial is rebut-
table, and that a covenant may cease to touch and concern over time.
The intent of the original parties, as reflected in the language of the
covenant, is therefore less important than the impact of the burdens
and benefits over time.68 Touch and concern requires an application
of the law of relational contracts. 69 As Professor Berger put it in 1970:
"The real policy, then, is to give effect to the intent that most people
63. Id. at 796.
64. Id.
65. See infra notes 101-111 and accompanying text for a fuller elaboration of this
argument.
66. See Epstein, supra note 49, at 1360.
67. Professor Epstein goes further and argues that the touch and concern require-
ment imposes transaction costs on subsequent purchasers because the require-
ment "will have to be evaluated in every case." Id. at 1361.
68. See Berger, supra note 24, at 219-20. Professor Berger argued that touch and
concern pertains not to the actual state of mind of the original parties but to
"what the normal expectations of society would be as to whether this particular
benefit or burden so relates to the owner in his capacity as owner that the aver-
age person would assume that the law would decree that such benefit or burden
would accompany the ownership." Id.
69. The best articulation of this position is Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom
of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IowA L. REV. 615
(1985). For a critical analysis of this justification for judicial intervention, see
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would probably have if they thought about the issue and thereby pro-
tect subsequent parties against unexpected and unexpectable
liability."70
IV. THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:
SERVITUDES AND THE VALIDITY OF SERVITUDES
A. The ALI Case for Judicial Scrutiny
ALI Restatements have been extremely influential because they
bring order and uniformity to a welter of cases in the 50 states.71
More generally, they reflect the shift from common law to civil law
analysis.72 Modem judges have less time and patience to synthesize
long lines of cases. General principles, embodied in Restatements, al-
low them to decide cases. The Restatement (Servitudes)'s reform of
the law of servitudes generally fulfills the expectations of the restate-
ment process. However, in a replay of the intense debates surround-
ing the 1944 Restatement (First), the Restatement (Servitudes)'s
handling of touch and concern has not been without controversy. The
basic issue is whether the elimination of touch and concern and its
rebirth in the new rules of servitude invalidity represent progress.
The basic standards of invalidity were proposed in 1990 and were re-
vised constantly until their approval at the May, 1998 annual meeting
of the ALl.
The Restatement (Servitudes) is premised on the assumption that
the use of extensive and intrusive servitude schemes by common in-
terest communities renders the touch and concern requirement obso-
lete because it does not adequately "identify servitudes that create
risks of harm."7 3 Thus, more sophisticated tests are needed to screen
modern servitudes. The Restatement (Servitudes) identifies two cate-
gories of potentially invalid servitudes: (1) lifestyle restrictions and
(2) assessments that lack a sufficient nexus between the amount and
Clayton Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1375,
1405-17 (1994).
70. Berger, supra note 24, at 208. Professor Singer articulates a similar justification
for the doctrine. "The dominant consideration in touch and concern cases seems
to be the conclusion that the obligation and/or benefit is the kind that should run
with the land ...." JOSEPH WILL SINGER, PROPERTY LAW § 4.4.1.4 (2d ed.
1997).
71. See Gregory E. Maggs, Ipse Dixit: The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the
Modern Development of Contract Law, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 508, 538-40 (1998).
72. The influence of German legal science on the development of "an unofficial form
of codification: the Restatements of Law" is briefly but trenchantly described in
Arthur T. Von Mehren, Some Reflections on Codification and Case Law in the
Twenty-First Century, 31 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 659, 667-69 (1998).
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. b (Tentative Draft
No. 7, 1998).
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homeowner benefits.74 In general, the Restatement (Servitudes) as-
sumes that the serious contemporary issue is not a fiscal issue, but an
intrusion on autonomy and dignity. The battle revolves around re-
strictions on speech, pets, children and the exclusion of controversial
land uses.75 The primary goal of the Restatement (Servitudes) is to
articulate a non-constitutional standard of judicial review to address
such restrictions.
B. Common Interest Communities and State Action
Many modern servitude challenges involve the assertion of consti-
tutional rights, but there is no consensus that the Constitution pro-
tects common interest community residents against RCA restrictions.
This is a different issue from the power of these communities to prac-
tice exclusion and discrimination which cannot be practiced by citi-
zens and public governmental units. The Constitution only protects
individuals against "state action," and the issue is whether servitudes
imposed by private common interest communities constitute state
action.
The mere enforcement of a common law right is not state action.
There are two exceptions to this rule. The first is the rule of Shelly v.
Kramer76 which holds that racially restrictive servitudes are unconsti-
tutional. The second is the "company town" doctrine which holds that
private communities that perform the function of public communities
are subject to the First Amendment.77 However, neither doctrine sup-
ports subjecting RCA servitude schemes to constitutional review.
Shelly's rationale remains problematic and the case remains confined
to racial and other similar discriminatory covenants. Shelly supports
the central twentieth century constitutional principle that direct ra-
cial segregation is unconstitutional, but it is not the basis for general
application of the state action doctrine to common interest commumi-
ties.78 Common interest communities vary too widely in size and
scope to warrant a blanket rule that they are the functional equivalent
74. See id. § 3.1 cmts. a-d.
75. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.8 (Council Draft No. 8,
1997).
76. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
77. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). Marsh was applied in Guttenberg
Taxpayers & Rentpayers Association v. Galaxy Towers Condominium Association,
688 A.2d 156 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996), which held that the condominium
association was a company town, and thus, could not deny access to citizens
group to distribute campaign flyers. However, other courts have upheld sign re-
strictions. See Midlake on Big Boulder Lake, Condominium Ass'n v. Cappuccio,
673 A.2d 340 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
78. See Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136, 144 (Ct. App.
1981)(stating that there is "considerable doubt" as to whether the actions of the
condominium association constitute state action.)
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of public governments. This reasoning has been generally applied by
the courts to common interest communities to distinguish them from
public governments. 7 9 Moreover, not all assertions of autonomy rise
to the constitutional level. For example, there is no constitutional
right to own a pet.SO The Reporter initially sought to develop rules
that applied both constitutional and common law tests to the validity
of such servitudes, but the attempt to develop a constitutional law of
servitude invalidity "met with substantial disagreement."81 In re-
sponse, Section 3.1 restates the obvious-unconstitutional servitudes
are invalid-but attempts to articulate rules of non-constitutional in-
validity which mix well-understood common law doctrines with new
less well understood ones.8 2
The Restatement's current position reflects a grudging acceptance
of the theory that common interest communities are voluntary as-
sociations, and thus, it is fair to subject members to regulation which
is not subject to constitutional standards. The contract rationale is
supported by two considerations. First, the typical regulations, such
as architectural and design covenants adopted to promote the homoge-
neity of the community, do limit individual choice, but seldom infringe
fundamental constitutional rights.83 Servitudes intended to exclude
different groups, such as racial and religious minorities or the handi-
79. The cases are collected in RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.1
Reporter's note to cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 7, 1998), and show little judicial
inclination to extend Shelly v. Kramer beyond the racial exclusion context.
80. See Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Assoc., 878 P.2d 1275, 1291
(Cal. 1994) (Condominium declaration can exclude cats and dogs because "[tihere
is no federal or state constitutional provisions ... that confers a general right to
keep household pets in condominiums or other common interest developments.");
Board of Dirs. of 175 East Del. Place Homeowners Ass'n v. Hinojosa, 679 N.E.2d
407 (Il. App. Ct. 1997). The proposed Restatement (Servitudes) originally made
it easy to invalidate prohibitions on pet ownership. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 6.7(4) (Preliminary Draft 14, 1997). However, the final
version adopted in May, 1997, makes it more difficult to challenge pet restric-
tions. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 6.7(3) (Tentative
Draft No. 7, 1998). Section 6.7(3) prohibits "regulations governing use or occu-
pancy of, or of behavior with, individually owned property," but subsections (1)
and (2) allow reasonable rules to protect the use of common property or to protect
other unit owners from "unreasonable interference in the enjoyment of their
properties." As a cat and dog lover, I can vouch for the Restatement's unstated
proposition that pet ownership is an important aspect of human self-fulfillment.
There are, however, a number of competing community and individual interests
that must be accommodated in the development of a pet or companion animal
policy. See Companion Animals Act 1998, No. 87 of New South Wales, Australia
(imposing strict identification and control standards on cat and dog ownership).
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES (Council Draft No. 8, at 50).
82. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVrIUDES § 3.1 (2) (Tentative Draft
No. 7, 1998).
83. As Clayton Gillette has observed, 'ihe existence of homogeneity suggests that
minority interests are less likely to arise, since residents share a common vision
embodied in the covenants." Gillette, supra note 69, at 1413.
19981
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
capped, pose the greatest risk that constitutional principles will be un-
dermined. But, the risk has been reasonably well-contained by federal
and state anti-discrimination laws and state laws prohibiting certain
exclusionary covenants.8 4 Second, there is a sufficient choice among
common interest communities and exit is generally an affordable op-
tion to support the contract justification for holding that these commu-
nities are not de facto public governments.8 5
The contractual theory of a private government posits that the citi-
zen gets what the private constitution provides and no more. How-
ever, this theory, like all theories, has its limitations. Purchase of a
property interest in a community is consent to the private constitu-
tion. Because the purchase of a unit of real property is so important,
purchasers will self-select into communities with acceptable regula-
tion. This theory can be seen in the cases which hold that private ar-
chitectural review covenants allow for greater beneficiary discretion
compared to a public government. The basic problem with the con-
tract argument is that it focuses on the initial entry, rather than on
the continuing relationship between the community and the member.
The contract theory is a strong argument for less judicial protection
compared to a public community. It is not an argument for no
protection.8 6
C. Substitute State Action
The new and innovative part of the proposed Restatement (Servi-
tudes) is the section on servitude invalidity. The section both restates
basic laws and substitutes several new standards of servitude invalid-
ity for the touch and concern doctrine. The section has been extremely
controversial because of the effort to subject servitudes to new consti-
tutional or quasi-constitutional standards. Section 3.1 provides: "A
84. See, e.g., Barrett v. Dawson, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899 (Ct. App. 1998)(California stat-
ute that voided covenants which excluded day care centers in residential neigh-
borhoods retroactive).
85. See Marc Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community Self-Governance in Residential
Associations, Municipalities and Indian Country: A Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L.
REv. 1053 (1998). Professor Rosen attempts a liberal political justification for
allowing a high degree of autonomy among some types of "perfectionist" commu-
nities, such as non-traditional religious sects. The existence of exit options is a
critical part of these argument that these communities are compatible with the
idea of equal liberty for all citizens. See id. at 1097-1106. Common interest com-
munities are not perfectionist communities because they lack an affirmative vi-
sion, but the principle that exit justifies a high degree of autonomy supports the
claim that they are not de facto public governments.
86. See Stewart E. Sterk, Minority Protection in Residential Private Governments, 77
B.U. L. REV. 273, 300-06 (1997).
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servitude created under the rules set forth in Chapter 2 is valid unless
it is illegal or unconstitutional or violates public policy."8 7
Servitudes that are invalid because they violate public policy in-
clude, but are not limited to: (1) servitudes that are arbitrary, spiteful
or capricious;8 8 (2) servitudes that unreasonably burden fundamental
constitutional rights;8 9 (3) servitudes that impose unreasonable re-
straints on alienation under the rules of § 3.4 and § 3.5;90 (4) servi-
tudes that impose unreasonable restraints on trade or competition
under the rule of § 3.5;91 and (5) servitudes that are unconscionable
under the Rule of § 3.7.92 Section 3.1 performs four separate func-
tions. These will be discussed in descending order of controversy.
First, the section simply restates the law without either elaborating or
clarifying well-established doctrines. Subsection three restates the
modem rule that reasonable restraints on alienation in common inter-
est communities will be allowed, but that courts retain the power to
decide if a restraint is unreasonable. 9 3 The Restatement (Servitudes)
provides a minor elaboration of this rule, but does not add to the anal-
ysis developed by the courts.94 Second, Section 3.1 eliminates many
per se rules against the creation of servitudes. The two most impor-
tant rules that it eliminates are the distinction between affirmative
and negative covenants that is followed only in New York state9 5 and
the per se prohibition against covenants not to compete.9 6 Third, it
attempts to articulate a common law-based theory of invalidity that is
more precise and more suited to policing common interest communi-
ties than the touch and concern requirement. This is where the Re-
statement (Servitudes) becomes more problematic. Fourth, the
section retains the "company town" doctrine articulated in Marsh v.
Alabama97 because it allows courts to apply constitutional standards
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (Tentative Draft No. 7,
1998).
88. See id. § 3.1 (1).
89. See id. § 3.1 (2).
90. See id. § 3.1 (3).
91. See id. § 3.1 (4).
92. See id. § 3.1 (5).
93. See id. § 3.1 (3).
94. Sections 3.4 and 3.5, approved in 1991, distinguish between indirect and direct
restraints. Most servitudes will be challenged as indirect restraints and Section
3.5 requires courts to weight the utility of the restraint against the injurious con-
sequences of enforcement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES
§ 3.4-3.5 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1991).
95. See infra note 113.
96. American courts have long enforced restrictions against competition if they are
intended to run and are limited to a specific geographic area. See Whitinsville
Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 390 N.E.2d 243 (Mass. 1979). The issue is not the unfair-
ness to a subsequent purchaser with notice but whether area consumer choice is
unduly constricted.
97. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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to servitudes, but gives RCAs a greater defense compared to public
governments. If a law infringes a fundamental constitutional interest,
the government has the difficult burden of establishing a compelling
state interest. In contrast, a RCA may assert a rule of reason defense.
The basic problem with third and fourth standards is that they are
too vague and will deter judicial use. They confer a great deal of dis-
cretion on courts, but the occasions for their use will be very limited.
Neither unconscionability nor public policy are likely to be major re-
straints on servitude enforcement and do not represent an improve-
ment over the touch and concern doctrine. Section 3.1 allows a court
to invalidate servitudes "that are unconscionable under the Rule of
§ 3.7."98 The Restatement (Servitudes) borrows the term from the
Uniform Commercial Code.99 Unconscionability is a backward-look-
ing doctrine that refers to the circumstances surrounding the original
covenant. The doctrine is both procedural and substantive,10 0 but
neither definition is likely to apply to most servitude schemes. The
UCC model of oppressive over-reaching and equal bargaining power
does not fit the normal common interest community purchaser.iOi It
will be difficult for a unit owner to prove that a servitude was imposed
to take advantage of a purchaser by over-reaching. Furthermore,
courts are unlikely to find that a servitude is substantively unfair
merely because it imposes financial burdens on the purchaser. The
purchaser generally gets some substantial benefit from the CCRs.
The issue is whether there is a sufficient nexus between burdens and
benefits. Touch and concern is better tailored to address nexus issues
than is unconscionability.
Public policy is a better candidate for an invalidation standard
than unconscionability. Courts have long held that covenants which
are contrary to public policy are invalid.10 2 However, courts are un-
98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (5) (Tentative Draft No. 7,
1998).
99. Section 3.7, approved in 1991, originally provided that "[a] Servitude is invalid if
it is unconscionable and that a court may refuse to enforce a servitude or may
limit or modify its application to avoid any unconscionable result." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.7 (Preliminary Draft No. 6, 1990). The fi-
nal version contains only the first sentence. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP-
ERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.7 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1991). The original comments
quoted ROBERT NATELSON, LAW OF PROPERTY OwNERs ASSOCIATIONS § 7.7 (1989),
who reported that he found no case invalidating a servitude on substantive un-
conscionability and the final illustrations include prohibitions against suing the
RCA or the requirement that purchasers pay the RCA a royalty on future unit
sales, but they do not provide a general analysis of the doctrine applicability to
servitudes as opposed to commercial and consumer sales.
100. See Arthur Left, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967).
101. See E. ALLAN FARNsWoRTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28 (3d ed. 1999).
102. See Benner v. Hammond, 673 N.E.2d 205 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
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likely to use public policy as a general invitation to create a new com-
mon law of invalidity. Courts have interpreted public policy to be a
doctrine that invalidates contracts which are contrary to legislation,
"good morals," or are for an illegal or immoral purpose.103 Most real
covenants will fall under the first category, and thus, courts will gen-
erally only invoke public policy if there is sufficiently clear legislative
guidance.1 04 In short, the doctrine is not a general invitation to courts
to determine what is or is not consistent with public policy. Rather, it
is a doctrine that allows courts to infer that the legislature has pre-
empted RCA authority. Courts are either likely to find that the cove-
nant serves a public policy or to find that the state has preempted the
use of private servitudes to ex6lude certain groups, such as the handi-
capped or child care facilities, from common interest communities. It
will seldom, if ever, be applied to determine where there is a sufficient
nexus between financial burdens and benefits.
The close connection between public policy and preemption is illus-
trated by Providence Construction Co. v. Bauer.1 0 5 The case invali-
dated a covenant imposed in the deeds of purchasers in the first phase
of a multi-stage mixed use project. In essence, the covenant warned
that subsequent phases would not be only single family residential
lots but would include "apartments, townhouses, condominiums, patio
homes, shopping centers . . ." and prohibited first phase purchasers
from opposing any rezoning petitions on "any and all contiguous land"
which the developer presently owned or might acquire.i06 The devel-
oper analogized the covenant to covenants restricting the use of land,
but the court applied Georgia's anti-SLAPPi07 statute and held that
the covenant was contrary to public policy.lOS Both its vagueness and
over-broadness "would prevent all lot purchasers in a development
from exercising their constitutional rights to oppose government ac-
tion which may effect their neighborhood's character and the proper-
ties' value."109
103. See Porubiansky v. Emory Univ., 275 S.E.2d 163 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980), affd, 282
S.E.2d 903 (Ga. 1981).
104. See Southern Neb. Rural Pub. Power Dist. v. Nebraska Elec. Generation &
Transmission Coop. Inc., 249 Neb. 913, 546 N.W.2d 315 (1996); Jeffrey Lake Dev.,
Inc. v. Central Neb. Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 5 Neb. App. 974, 568 N.W.2d
585 (1997).
105. 494 S.E.2d 527 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, Leventhal v. Bauer, 119 S. Ct.
799 (1999).
106. Id. at 529.
107. See id. at 528, 530. The "anti-SLAPP" statute was designed to prevent "Strategic
Litigation Against Public Participation," and to encourage citizens to participate
in matters of public interest through the exercise of their constitutional rights.
See id. at 528-29.
108. See id. at 530.
109. Id. The court distinguished Muldawer v. Stribling, 256 S.E.2d 357 (Ga. 1979),
which enforced a covenant between two adjoining lot owners which forbade the
purchaser from rezoning. See id.
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V. A CONSUMER PROTECTION RATIONALE FOR TOUCH
AND CONCERN
A. The Consumer Protection Theory: A Benefit-Burden
Nexus
The most persuasive rationale for the touch and concern doctrine is
that it protects the expectations of common interest community pur-
chasers. 110 Common interest community residents purchase a service
package. To borrow from the Supreme Court's land use exaction juris-
prudence, purchasers accept that a reasonable nexus between finan-
cial burden and demonstrable benefits will be maintained over
time."' The consumer protection rationale is supported by the follow-
ing two primary reasons. First, the consumer protection rationale
limits the scope of judicial intervention. Judicial intervention will be
limited to a narrow class of cases where the benefit or burden is unre-
lated "to.an objective purpose of land planning."112 Second, the con-
sumer protection rationale is less costly to administer compared to
other rationales advanced for touch and concern.
The consumer protection rational starts from the assumption that
a restrictive covenant scheme is a private government. An RCA is not
a private redistributive scheme. A member has a right to the dedica-
tion of assessments which benefit his or her property and common
community facilities. Transaction cost considerations may dictate
some form of representative government so each member need not
agree to each expenditure. The status of a citizen of a private govern-
ment, compared to a citizen of a public government, is the subject of
considerable scholarly dispute. The consumer protection rationale re-
solves this dispute by characterizing the citizen as primarily a con-
sumer of limited services. Public governments also provide services,
110. Professor Jeffrey E. Stake made this argument in his 1988 article, Toward an
Economic Understanding of Touch and Concern, 1988 DuKE L.J. 925. His basic
argument was that the doctrine was a useful check against improvident actions
and should be used to determine the efficient allocation of the burdens and bene-
fits of land-related promises rather than to invalidate covenants that had become
inefficient over time. In my opinion, the focus should be on fairness rather than
efficiency. But, his central point remains valid because efficiency and consumer
protection will often lead to the same results because a burden that imposes high
costs with few corresponding benefits can be characterized as both inefficient and
unfair. See id. at 963; cf. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Assoc., 878
P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994)(adopting an expectation protection analysis to uphold a
condominium declaration which excluded cats and dogs, but too narrowly limited
expectation protection to the enforcement of the originally recorded document).
111. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). The Supreme Court's applica-
tion of the nexus test to public governments has been justly criticized as too re-
strictive, but the case for reasonable nexus between burdens and benefits is
stronger in common interest community. A purchaser should receive the services
promised by the RCA.
112. Reichman, supra note 28, at 1233.
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but a citizen has no right to any particular service package. Ajudicial
role to ensure that decisions do in fact enhance the fair and efficient
allocation of resources within the community follows. This consumer
protection function historically has been performed by the courts,
although some local consumer protection agencies provide advice to
RCA members to enable them to assert what rights they have. This
rationale does not depend on the size of the private government. It
may be a two-citizen direct democracy if the burden and benefit of the
covenant is limited to two tracts of land. It may equally be a represen-
tative government involving many tracts of land in a large scale,
planned community. The expectations of citizens of private govern-
ments are essentially the same. The core landowner expectation is to
receive measurable benefits that inure to the value of the land.
The most important issue regarding the touch and concern require-
ment is whether the enforcement of the covenant against the present
benefit and burden holders is fair. This test can be reduced to per se
rules such as whether the covenant is affirmative or negative. 1' 3 How-
ever, per se tests are only a proxy for determining whether the burden
is unfair over a long period of time. 114 Thus, this question should be
addressed directly as touch and concern allows courts to do. A court
must determine whether the original rationale for the covenant is still
present. This inquiry is tied up with the question of whether the par-
ties intended that the covenant be personal or "run" with the land, but
it is different, as earlier argued, because it is both backward and for-
113. Only New York State clings to the English rule that affirmative covenants cannot
run. The rule was riddled with exceptions and Judge Lehman appeared to put it
to rest in Neponsit Property Owners'Association v. Emigrant Industrial Savings
Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1938), and Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corpo-
ration, 164 N.E.2d 832 (N.Y. 1959), but the court of appeals revived it in Eagle
Enterprises v. Gross, 349 N.E.2d 816 (1976). New York courts still appear to
treat running affirmative covenants as the exception, although no limitations ap-
pear to be in fact honored. See, e.g., City of New York v. Delafield 246 Corp., 662
N.Y.S.2d 286, 294 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)(reversing of trial court determination
that covenant to construct an underground garage and regrade surface did not
run because it was affirmative; covenants that protect natural features of the
land touch and concern).
114. This analysis is explicit in City of New York v. Delafield 246 Corporation, 662
N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). The current owner of a 10.5 acre estate that
was being converted to residential units refused to comply with a covenant that
required the original mansion on the estate to be preserved. The covenant fur-
ther provided that a set number of individual components of construction be com-
pleted within a specified period. See id. at 288-89. The owner-developer argued
that the covenant was a void affirmative covenant because it imposed a burden in
perpetuity. See id. at 294. However, the court held that the covenant did not
impose a burden in perpetuity because the duty would be extinguished once the
owner submitted a plan to restore the mansion and that the owner-developer
could petition the holder of the benefit, New York City, for a modification of the
agreement and a zoning amendment for the land. See id. at 296.
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ward looking.' 1 5 As a lower New York court put it: "The greater the
degree the covenant imposes obligations unique to the covenantors,
which cannot exist independently of them, the less likely the covenant
... touches and concerns the land. Conversely, the greater the effect
of the covenant on the land itself, without regard for who owns it, the
more likely it will be binding on successor owners."'1 6 In that case,
the current owner of a 10.5 acre estate originally bequeathed to Co-
lumbia University refused to perform a covenant to preserve existing
trees on the property and to restore any trees damaged during the
construction of a 38 unit residential development.1 1 7 The court found
that the covenant touched and concerned the land because it was in-
tended "'to preserve and protect the natural features and ecological
balance of the property.'"" 8 The court's decision reflects an implicit
judgment that the expressly assumed burdens and benefits remain
fair at the time of the litigation.
B. Some Possible Cases for the Use of Touch and Concern
1. Assessment Diversion
The primary function of the touch and concern doctrine is judicial
protection of purchaser expectations from risks, such as fund diver-
sion or uneven maintenance. The growing evidence of RCA member
dissatisfaction with the performance of associations suggests a need
for some judicial constraints on association decisions. The first pur-
chasers in an RCA strike an explicit and implicit bargain with the
developer for the allocation of assessments. However, this allocation
may be unilaterally altered as time passes. Consistent with this anal-
ysis, courts sensibly have used the touch and concern doctrine to po-
lice the assessment process. The modern law is premised on the
assumption that members of an RCA have a right to have assessments
dedicated to the benefit of the community and continue to inure to the
unit owner's property. Courts require that the RCA establish stan-
dards to allocate the assessments and that the members receive the
primary benefit of the assessments.
115. Courts use the intent inquiry to invalidate covenants, often between two individ-
uals, that include burdens and benefits that are difficult to measure and thus
pose a risk of unfairness over time. See Caullett v. Stanley Stilwell & Sons, Inc.,
170 A.2d 52 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961)(construing an in gross covenant
which reserved right in grantor to construct a house on land conveyed to
covenantee).
116. City of New York v. Delafield 246 Corp., 662 N.Y.S.2d 286, 294 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997).
117. See id. at 288-89.
118. Id. at 294 (quoting the covenant). The court used the same rationale to justify
enforcement of covenants to construct an underground garage and to regrade the
property.
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Touch and concern can play a useful consumer protection function
when a homeowners' association diverts fees intended for community
common areas. Beech Mountain Property Owners Association v.
Seifart1 9 is an example of a case where the touch and concern doc-
trine can be applied to justify a result that the court reached with no
analysis. The dispute arose in a Blue Ridge Mountains subdivision
with a golf course, tennis courts, swimming pool and ski runs.120 Con-
dominium purchasers assumed road and recreational facility mainte-
nance assessments.12' In the mid-1970s, the developer filed for
bankruptcy and the reorganized corporation opened the golf course
and ski runs to the general public.122 Several homeowners objected to
the use of their assessments for the golf facility which consumed 75%
of the assessment.12 3 No assessments were used to maintain the ski
runs. 124 The court framed the issue of whether the covenants were
sufficiently certain to be enforced, rather than if they ran.12 5 How-
ever, the court's result is grounded in the touch and concern doctrine.
The court held that the covenants contained "no sufficient standard by
which to measure the defendants' liability for assessments"'126 be-
cause there was "no clearly defined limiting standard by which the
court can determine whether the assessment made in any particular
year against any particular property owner is authorized both as to
amount and purpose by the covenants applicable to his property."127
The business judgment rule is an alternative route to this result,
but the proposed Restatement (Servitudes) makes it difficult to apply
to assessment diversion cases. To catch obvious redistribution at-
tempts, courts have imposed a fiduciary duty on the RCA directors
toward their members. This doctrine polices the decisions of an RCA
by trying to decide when the directors have engaged in self-dealing, as
opposed to having made a good faith, but unpopular, decision that
benefits the members. This doctrine provides minimum guarantees
that RCAs function as representative governments, but does not inter-
vene in efficient, but unpopular, decisions.
The Restatement test is not well-suited to resolve disputes over as-
sessments and other fees when intervention may be warranted. For
example in Rasp v. Hidden Valley Lake, Inc.,' 28 a group of lake subdi-
vision lot owners challenged a take or pay covenant imposed by the
119. 269 S.E.2d 178 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
120. See id. at 180-81.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 182.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 182-83.
126. Id. at 183.
127. Id. at 184.
128. 519 N.E.2d 153 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
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developer for the benefit of its water and sewer subsidiary. They ar-
gued that non-connected lots received no benefits from the utility.12 9
The court first applied a public policy analysis and posed a dilemma:
the covenant furthered the policy of orderly and healthful land devel-
opment but was inconsistent with private entrepreneurial activity.i30
It resolved the dilemma by resort to public utility law. The best public
policy encourages, by a "mildly coercive incentive" all lot owners to
connect to the utility so that public health is improved and the broader
the rate base, the lower the rates the utility can charge.' 3 ' The court
also held that the covenant touched and concerned the land, but it did
offer any reasons for its decisions.i 3 2 Take or pay obligations could be
defended if the property in the subdivision is in fact benefitted, but the
touch and concern doctrine would allow the owners to prove that an
insufficient nexus exists between burden and benefit.
2. Excessive Product Bundling: The Problem of Compulsory
Club Memberships
Service providers, such as public utilities, have traditionally sold
bundled products. For most electricity consumers, the tariff includes
the price of fuel, generation, transmission and distribution. The elec-
tric utility industry is currently undergoing a radical restructuring,
and one of the goals of this process is to unbundle products. When
products are unbundled, a consumer might chose to buy only trans-
mission from a utility. Like public utilities, many common interest
communities offer bundled services. Courts have not used the touch
and concern doctrine to unbundle the basic service package, which in-
cludes common areas and open space. Courts have not articulated a
general theory of the basic service package, but the theory seems to be
that all members must use certain common areas, such as roads.' 33
This extends to less essential services such recreational facilities.' 34
Covenants that require a landowner to purchase membership in
sports club have raised more problems.
129. See id. at 155-56.
130. See id. at 156.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 157.
133. See Chesapeake Ranch Club, Inc. v. C.R.C. United Members, Inc., 483 A-2d 1334,
1338 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984).
134. See Anthony v. Brea Glenbrook Club, 130 Cal. Rptr. 32 (Ct. App. 1976); Bessemer
v. Gersten, 381 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. 1980). This analysis is also supported by the
cases which imply the power to levy recreational assessments. See, e.g., Meadow
Run and Mountain Lake Park Ass'n v. Berkel, 598 A.2d 1024 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991)(stating that residential communities are 'analogous to mini-governments"
and are dependent on collection of assessments to provide and maintain recrea-
tional facilities).
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The cases are split on the issue of whether such servitudes touch
and concern, although the majority rule seems to be that recreational
assessments touch and concern the land.1 35 Courts which hold that
mandatory sports club membership touches and concerns the land
have concluded that the club confers value on the lot, regardless of
whether the protesting owner uses the facility or not.1 36 There have
been dissenting courts. Several courts have found that the covenant
does not touch and concern because the covenant is personall37 or
does not "necessarily increase the value of the individual lots."138 One
can accept the rationale that service bundle benefits the property even
if individuals perceive no benefit. In general, courts have been wise to
leave the original service bundle in place. Purchasers who follow Rob-
ert Maynard Hutchins' dictum that "[w]henever I feel the need to ex-
ercise, I lie down,"139 are not harmed because the service package
adds value to their property which can be recouped when it is sold.
However, servitudes with unequal benefits suggest that touch and
concern can be used to catch the occasional case where the nexus be-
tween burden and benefit is too strained because of additional limita-
tions on the allocation of the benefits. An Oregon Court of Appeals
held that a mandatory golf club initiation fee did not enhance the
value of protestant's lot because the declaration limited mandatory
purchasers to the original purchasers.14o Subsequent owners were
merely eligible to become members.4i
VI. CONCLUSION
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Roman law was re-
ceived on the European continent and again threatened the survival of
the common law. In addition, the absolutism of the Stuarts "put com-
mon law in great peril, for government by unrestrained divine right
135. See Streams Sports Club, Ltd. v. Richmond, 457 N.E.2d 1226, 1231 (Ill. 1983)
136. See Anthony v. Brea Glenbrook Club, 130 Cal. Rptr. 32 (Ct. App. 1976)(mainte-
nance of common swimming pool made it unnecessary for individual lot owners to
install pools); Four Seasons Homeowners Ass'n v. Sellers, 302 S.E.2d 848 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1983)(recreational facilities do not have to be adjacent to each lot to
touch and concern); Homseyv. University Gardens Racquet Club, 730 S.W.2d 763
(Tex. App. 1987)(fact that club open to the public irrelevant for purposes of deter-
mining whether landowners benefited from covenant).
137. See Raintree Corp. v. Rowe, 248 S.E.2d 904, 909 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978).
138. Chesapeake Ranch Club, Inc. v. C.R.C. United Members, Inc., 483 A.2d 1334,
1337 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984).
139. ROBERT MAYNARD HuTCHINS, THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AiERICA 77 (1936). This
oft quoted remark was a humorous defense to his promotion of the abolition of
intercollegiate athletics at the University of Chicago and reflected his deep-
seated belief that "body building" had no place in the true university.
140. See Ebbe v. Senior Estates Golf and Country Club, 657 P.2d 696 (Or. Ct. App.
1983).
141. See id. at 701-02.
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might have produced subservient judges."142 Many historians attri-
bute the survival of the common law to its ability to offer a less arbi-
trary, more democratic alternative to Stuart absolutism.143 The idea
that common law can be perfected by systematic reform lives on. The
Restatement (Third) is the living embodiment of this ideal and par-
tially reflects the argument of the law and economics movement that
courts judge common law rules by their efficiency rather than by their
fairness. However, in the end, fairness is a preferable judicial objec-
tive. It builds on a long common law tradition, and thus, can be ad-
ministered in a restrained, but effective, manner. A major benefit of
the vagueness of the touch and concern standard is that while it locks
the court into a single test, it gives the court flexibility to adapt the
doctrine to contemporary servitude issues. 144 In short, the open-
ended nature of the doctrine is its greatest virtue14 5 and there is a
case for the Restatement to simply "restate" the doctrine and let
courts continue to develop it as necessary.1 4 6
142. ARTHUR R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAW 229 (1996).
143. One of the great legacies of Seventeenth Century England is the idea that law is
designed to check arbitrary state power and to promote individual dignity and
freedom of action. See Sir William S. Holdsworth, The Influence of the Legal Pro-
fession on the Growth of the English Constitution, in ESSAYS ON LAW AND LEGAL
HISTORY, 71, 72 (A.L. Goodhart & H.G. Hanbury eds. 1946).
144. See, e.g., ROBERT H. RABIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW 484
(3d ed. 1992). Professor Curtis J. Berger and Joan Williams argue that the
vagueness of the doctrine confuses two separate issues: enforcement against the
original covenantor and the refusal to enforce against subsequent purchasers be-
cause of changed conditions or public policy. See CURTIS J. BERGER & JOAN WILLI-
LAMS, PROPERTY: LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 707 (4th ed. 1997).
145. In his essay on the theoretical underpinnings of common interest communities,
Gregory S. Alexander writes that "open-ended legal norms, precisely because
they do not purport to have achieved closure ex ante, create opportunities for
those inside and those outside to engage each other in dialogue. They deny to
both sides the apparently comforting message that their side is legally privi-
leged." Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Com-
munity Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 57 (1988). In a
recent article, Realism and Formalism in the Severance of Joint Tenancies, 77
NEB. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (1998), Professor R.H. Helmholz has shown that reform of
the common law does not eliminate the need for formalism. Old common law
doctrines can be infused with more open-ended concepts such as intent and rea-
sonableness and still continue to perform useful functions in the resolution of
individual disputes.
146. The Restatement process will always have its limits. Judge Learned Hand was
both appreciative of the ALI's efforts to rationale precedents and suspicious of the
ultimate merits of the idea. See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND
THE JUDGE 312-13 (1994).
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